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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court had original appellate jurisdiction of this appeal under 
Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)G). Pursuant to its authority under Utah Code section 
78A-3-102(4) and Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 42(a), the Utah Supreme Court 
transferred this appeal to this Court on September 8, 2015. This Court has jurisdiction 
under Utah Code section 78A-4-103(2)O). 
ST A TEMENT OF ISSUES / ST AND ARDS OF REVIEW 1 
Appellee does not agree with and is dissatisfied with Appellant's statement of the 
issues on appeal and statement of the case. Pursuant to Rule 24(b )( 1) of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, Appellee provides the following statement of the issues: 
Issue No. 1: Did Judge Shumate and Judge Westfall2 agree with each other that 
the original Real Estate Purchase Contract for Construction, including its twelve (12) 
written addenda (together referred to as "REPC"), constitutes the entire agreement 
between Appellants and Sun Hill Homes, L.C. and did these two district court judges 
agree that the REPC was never modified by the parties. 
Standard of Review: Judge Shumate stated at the trial in this matter that the REPC 
" ... is in fact the agreement between the parties, that is basically uncontroverted". Judge 
1 This appeal arises from the district court's order granting Sun Hill Homes, L.C.'s ("Sun 
Hill") Motion under Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6) & (7). 
2 Judge James Shumate was the first judge assigned to this matter. Judge Shumate 
handled this case through discovery, a motion for summary judgment, and a two day trial. 
After entering his findings and before Sun Hill's Rule 59 Motion, Judge Shumate retired. 
The case was then transferred to Judge G. Michael Westfall and Judge Westfall reviewed 
the pleadings in this case, the trial transcripts, evidence, and Sun Hill's Rule 59 Motion. 
Judge Westfall then amended Judge Shumate's prior findings and conclusions of law, but 
the two judges essentially agreed on all issues of fact. 
I 
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Westfall made the same finding in his Order granting the Rule 59 Motion. "A contract's 
interpretation may be either a question of law, determined by the words of the agreement, 
or a question of fact, determined by extrinsic evidence of intent. If a trial court interprets 
a contract as a matter of law, we accord its construction no particular weight, reviewing 
its action under a correctness standard." Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P .2d 714, 716 (Utah 
1985). Factual findings made by the trial court will be upheld unless they are clearly 
erroneous. Mostrong v. Jackson, 866 P.2d 573, 577 (UT App. 1993). Here, Judge 
Shumate excluded extrinsic evidence and sustained objections based on parol evidence 
and held that the agreement of the parties was the language within the four comers of the 
REPC and Judge Westfall agreed. Appellants also stipulated that the REPC was 
integrated and admitted that it was unambiguous. Thus, the appropriate standard of 
review on this issue is one of correctness. Further, the standard of review when a district 
court grants a Rule 59 Motion is an abuse of discretion standard. Smith v. Fairfax Realty, 
Inc., 2003 UT 41, ,I25, 82 P.3d 1064 (stating that "[u]nder our rule 59, it is well settled 
that, as a general matter, the trial court has broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for 
a new trial. Under this standard of review, 'we will reverse only if there is no reasonable 
basis for the decision.'" ( citations omitted)). 
Citation to the Record: R. 2044 (Tr. Transcr. Vol. II, 87:5-10 (Dec. 3, 2013)); R. 
1752-1763, a copy of said ruling is attached to Addendum to Appellant's Brief as Exhibit 
E; R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 9:8 - 10:9 (Dec. 2, 2013)); R. 2042 (Hrg. Transcr. 8:24 -
9:1 (Oct. 29, 2013)). 
2 
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Issue No. 2: Are the Appellants precluded from arguing that the REPC is not the 
only agreement of the parties because of the Appellants' stipulation that the REPC is 
integrated and admission that the REPC is unambiguous? 
Standard of Review: During the hearing on Sun Hill's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Appellants admitted to Judge Shumate that the REPC was unambiguous. 
During the trial, the Appellants stipulated that the REPC was integrated in response to a 
question from Judge Shumate after an objection by Sun Hill regarding parol evidence. A 
review of stipulations are questions of law that are reviewed for correctness. Lloyd v. 
Lloyd, 2009 UT App 314, ~6, 221 P.3d 884 (citing Zions First Nat'! Bank, NA. v. 
National Am. Title Ins. Co., 7 49 P .2d 651, 653 (Utah 1988) (stating that "[ q]uestions of 
contract interpretation not requiring resort to extrinsic evidence are matters of law, and on 
such questions we accord the trial court's interpretation no presumption of correctness.") 
and Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (stating that 
"[a] stipulation is construed as a contract.")). 
Citation to the Record: R. 2042 (Hrg. Transcr. 8:24 - 9: I (Oct. 29, 2013)); R. 
2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 9:8 - 10:9 (Dec. 2, 2013)). 
Issue No. 3: Did Judge Westfall's order on the Rule 59 Motion properly find that 
Judge Shumate erred in finding that the REPC was silent with regard to the risk of loss 
related to the placement of soil at the property purchased by Appellants. 
Standard of Review: Judge Westfall found that the REPC was not silent on the 
issue of risk of loss associated with the placement of soil at Lot 8. The standard of 
review when a district court grants a Rule 59 Motion is an abuse of discretion standard. 
3 
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Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, ,I25, 82 P.3d 1064. "A contract's 
interpretation may be either a question of law, determined by the words of the agreement, 
or a question of fact, determined by extrinsic evidence of intent. If a trial court interprets 
a contract as a matter of law, we accord its construction no particular weight, reviewing 
its action under a correctness standard." Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P .2d 714, 716 (Utah 
1985) ( citation omitted). Here, both judges agreed that the REPC was the entire 
agreement of the parties and Judge Westfall found that Judge Shumate' interpretation was 
incorrect. 
Citation to Record: Judge Westfall found that: ~ 
... Judge Shumate made no finding that the parties ever mutually agreed that 
Sun Hill would be responsible to ensure the suitability of the soil for a 
swimming pool. He only found that Sun Hill was aware of Plaintiffs' 
intention to build a swimming pool in their backyard, ... and that the ~ 
absence of any agreement between the parties as to '[t]he risk of loss 
associated with the placement of as much as fifteen feet of additional soil 
on Lot 8' resulted in such risk being 'placed in the hands of Sun Hill 
Homes.' 
R. 17 59 ( emphasis in original). 
Judge Westfall then found that the REPC was "far from silent'~ on the issue of risk ofloss 
associated with the placement of addition soil at Lot 8. R. 1760. 
Issue No. 4: Did Judge Westfall correctly find that" ... the Judgment should be 
amended to correct the legal error that occurred when a contractual duty was imposed on 
Sun Hill to investigate the suitability of the soil for a swimming pool." R. 1760 
( emphasis added). 
4 
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Standard of Review: The standard of review when a district court grants a Rule 59 
Motion is an abuse of discretion standard. Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, 
,I25, 82 P.3d 1064 (stating that "[u]nder our rule 59, it is well settled that, as a general 
matter, the trial court has broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for a new trial. 
Under this standard of review, 'we will reverse only if there is no reasonable basis for the 
decision."' ( citations omitted)). "A contract's interpretation may be either a question of 
law, determined by the words of the agreement, or a question of fact, determined by 
extrinsic evidence of intent. If a trial court interprets a contract as a matter of law, we 
accord its construction no particular weight, reviewing its action under a correctness 
standard." Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985) (citation omitted)). 
Citation to Record: R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 9:8 - 10:9 & 10:23 - 11: 1 (Dec. 
2, 2013)); R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 9:8 - 10:9 (Dec. 2, 2013)); R. 2042 (Hrg. 
Transcr. 8:24-9:1 (Oct. 29, 2013)); R. 2044 (Tr. Transcr. Vol. II, 87:5-10 (Dec. 3, 
2013)); R. 1760. 
Issue No. 5: Did Judge Westfall correctly find that Sun Hill was the prevailing 
party and thus deserving of an award of attorneys' fees and costs where " ... there is no 
basis for holding Sun Hill liable for breach of contract. .. ". R. 1760 (emphasis added). 
Standard of Review: Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a question of law 
that is reviewed for correctness. Rohan v. Boseman, 2002 UT App 109, ,Il 7, 46 P.3d 
753. However,·· ... [w]hich party is the prevailing party is an appropriate question for the 
trial court." Crowley v. Black, 2007 UT App 245, ,r6, 167 P.3d 1087 (citing R.T. Nielson 
Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, ,r25, 40 P .3d 1119). As such, " ... review the trial court's 
5 
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determination as to who was the prevailing party [is] under an abuse of discretion 
standard." Id. 
Citation to Record: See R. 112-20 (Sun Hill's Answer in which claim was made 
for attorney fees and costs); See Also R. 1885-94 (Sun Hill's Motion for Award of 
Attorneys' Fees and Costs); See Also R. 2047 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at§ 25) (providing the 
contractual basis for an award of fees in this action). 
DETERMINATIVE RULE 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59(a) states that" ... on a motion for a new trial in 
an action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, 
take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new 
findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment [for the following 
reasons]: (a)(6) [i]nsufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or 
that it is against law[; or] (a)(7) [e]rror in law." See Utah R. Civ. P. 59, a complete copy 
of which is attached to this Brief in the Addendum as Exhibit A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
The Appellant purchased a home and lot from the Appellee, Sun Hill Homes, L.C 
("Sun Hill"). Sun Hill developed the lot and built the home ("Lot 8" or "Property"). Lot 
8 borders the Santa Clara River. During the construction of the home on Lot 8 and due to 
extensive flooding that occurred in Washington County in 2005, the government 
provided for the installation of rock walls to armor the banks of the river along Lot 8 and 
other adjacent lots. This rock wall armoring the river was provided by the government to 
6 
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help mitigate damage from future flooding of the river. Sun Hill accepted the assistance 
of the Natural Resources Conservation Service Division of the US Department of 
Agriculture to make changes to the grading and add rock walls to Lot 8 in order to protect 
the lot and the home being constructed on Lot 8 from future flooding of the river. The 
assistance from the government resulted in additional soil being added to Lot 8 and the 
lot size being increased. 
After the construction of the home on Lot 8 and after Appellants closed on the 
purchase of the home and lot from Sun Hill, the Appellants hired Anthony Bros. 
Construction ("Anthony Bros.") to construct a pool in the backyard of Lot 8. Appellants 
did not properly engineer the pool that Anthony Bros. constructed on Lot 8 in spite of the 
agreement between Sun Hill and the Appellants that requires that certain improvements 
to Lot 8 be properly engineered by Appellants. After construction of the pool by 
Anthony Bros., the pool experienced signs of differential movement and Appellants filed 
the underlying lawsuit claiming damages against both Anthony Bros. and Sun Hill for the 
failure of the pool. 
II. Course of Proceedings 
After litigating for nearly two years with Anthony Bros., which is the party that 
actually constructed the Appellants pool, the Appellants filed an amended complaint in 
the district court adding Sun Hill to this action. R. 95-106. Appellants alleged, among 
other things, breach of contract, non-disclosure, and unjust enrichment against Sun Hill. 
R. 95-106. After discovery, Sun Hill filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and a 
hearing was held on that Motion. R. 593-670; See Also R. 2042 (Hrg. Transcr., generally 
7 
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(Oct. 29, 2013)). At the October 29, 2013 hearing, Judge Shumate awarded partial 
summary judgment to Sun Hill and left for trial only Appellants breach of contract claims 
against Sun Hi113• R. 2042 (Hrg. Transcr. 16:17-23 & 19:15-18 (Oct. 29, 2013)), portions 
of the hearing held on the motion for summary judgment are included with this Brief in 
the Addendum as Exhibit B. 
A trial in this matter was held on December 2nd and 3rd of 2013. R. 2043 (Tr. 
Transcr. Vol. I, generally); R. 2044 (Tr. Transcr. Vol. II, generally). Judge Shumate 
made verbal findings on the record at the trial. The portion of the trial transcript 
containing Judge Shumate's verbal findings is attached to this Brief in the Addendum as 
Exhibit C. Judge Shumate ruled against Sun Hill at the trial and later entered Findings, 
Conclusions, and Judgment on March 17, 2014. R. 1597-1602. Thereafter, Judge 
Shumate retired and Sun Hill timely filed a Utah R. Civ. P. 59 Motion for a New Trial 
("Rule 59 Motion"). R. 1661-81. After a hearing on the Rule 59 Motion before a newly 
assigned judge, Judge Westfall entered his Decision and Order Granting Sun Hill Homes, ~ 
L.C.'s Motion for a New Trial. R. 1752-63; See Also R. 1783-1788, a copy of Judge 
Westfall's Order Vacating Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment; Amended Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment is attached to this Brief in the Addendum as 
Exhibit D. 
Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal of Judge Westfall's ruling on the Rule 59 
Motion, but because the matter of attorneys' fees had not been resolved, that appeal was 
3 The trial also consisted of claims by Appellants against the Defendant Anthony Bros. 
but the only claims remaining against Sun Hill were Appellants' breach of contract 
claims. 
8 
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dismissed. See R. 1933-34; See Also Order of Summary Dismissal in Appellate Case No. 
20150151-CA. After Judge Westfall awarded Sun Hill its fees under the attorneys' fees 
provision of the REPC, the Appellants appealed again. R. 1991-92. This matter now 
comes before this Court on the Appellants' appeal of Judge Westfall's order granting Sun 
Hill's Rule 59 Motion and appeal of the judgment against Appellants for attorneys' fees 
and costs. 
III. Disposition in the District Court 
Judge Westfall ruled in favor of Sun Hill finding that" ... the Judgment should be 
amended to correct the legal error that occurred when a contractual duty was imposed on 
Sun Hill to investigate the suitability of the soil for a swimming pool. Absent such duty, 
there is no basis for holding Sun Hill liable for breach of contract ... ". R. 1760 ( emphasis 
added). Judge Westfall then ruled that Sun Hill did not breach the REPC and entered 
final judgment against Appellants for Sun Hill's attorneys' fees and costs in the amount 
of$47,063.91. R. 1972-1973; See Also R. 2046 (Hrg. Transcr. at 11:6-7 (June 29, 
2015)). 
IV. Statement of Facts 
The REPC is the Parties' Agreement 
1. On or about December 4, 2004, Appellants entered into a Real Estate Purchase 
Contract for Construction with Sun Hill for the purchase of a lot and home to be 
constructed on that lot (together the home and lot are referred to as "Property" or "Lot 8"). 
·--' R. 2047 (Tr. Ex. 1), attached as Exhibit A to the Addendum to Appellant's Brief. 
9 
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2. The Real Estate Purchase Contract for Construction was signed by Marie 
Mardesich, who was defined in that written agreement as "Buyer", and ultimately 
included twelve (12) addenda dated from September 12, 2005 to May 15, 2006 that were 
signed by both Appellants John and Marie Mardesich ( the Real Estate Purchase Contract 
for Construction together with the twelve written addenda are referred to herein as 
"REPC"). R. 204 7 (Tr. Ex. I). 
3. The REPC contains an integration clause that states "[t]his Agreement together 
with its addenda, any attached exhibits, and any subsequent change or extra orders, 
constitutes the entire Agreement between Buyer and Seller and supersedes and replaces 
any and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or contracts, 
verbal or written, between buyer and Seller." R. 204 7 (Tr. Ex. I, REPC at § 29). 
4. The REPC also states that ''[t]his Agreement cannot be changed, amended, or 
altered without the written agreement of Buyer and Seller, which written agreement must 
be signed by Buyer and an authorized representative of Seller." R. 2047 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC 
at§ 29). 
5. At the hearing on Sun Hill's motion for summary judgment, and prior to trial 
in this matter, Appellants conceded that the REPC was unambiguous by stating " ... this is 
undisputed, and both parties agree that the REP-C [sic] is unambiguous." R. 2042 (Hrg. 
Transcr. at 8:24- 9:1 (Oct. 29, 2013)), an excerpt of which is attached to this Brief in the 
Addendum as Exhibit B. 
6. At trial, Appellants' stipulated that the REPC is integrated when counsel for 
the Appellants was asked by Judge Shumate ''[ c ]ounsel, is there some ambiguity in the 
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contract that would justify the Court looking at the parol in any way, shape, or form?"; 
and counsel for Appellants responded that "[y ]our Honor, as far as the integration in the 
contract, there isn't, although that's not where I'm going with this." R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., 
Vol. I, at 9:24 - 10:4 (Dec. 2, 2013)), an excerpt of which is attached to this Brief in the 
Addendum to as Exhibit E. 
7. At trial, Judge Shumate sustained an objection limiting parol evidence that was 
outside the four corners of the REPC. R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, at 9:24 - 10:4 (Dec. 2, 
2013)). 
8. To yet another objection on parol evidence, Judge Shumate stated "I will 
receive it not for its obviously parole [sic] purpose, but to explain the actions of the parties 
as they engaged in this process, the contract itself so far controls." R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., 
Vol. I, at 10:23 - 11:1 (Dec. 2, 2013)) (emphasis added). 
9. Ultimately, Judge Shumate found that the REPC or'' ... Exhibit No. 1, entered 
into by the parties with all 12 addenda is in/act the agreement between the parties, that is 
basically uncontroverted, and the exhibit that is in the Court's hands does and is found by 
the Court to be a full and true and correct copy of that agreement." R. 2044 (Tr. Transcr., 
Vol. II, at 87:5-10 (Dec. 3, 2013)), excerpts of the Tr. Transcr. Vol. II are attached to the 
Addendum to this Brief as Exhibit D. 
10. Judge Westfall interpreted the REPC as the agreement between the parties and 
stated that" ... Judge Shumate made no finding that the parties ever mutually agreed that 
Sun Hill would be responsible to ensure the suitability of the soil for a swimming pool." 
R. 1759. 
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11. There is no written addendum or other writing signed by Buyer and an 
authorized representative of Seller that states that Sun Hill would be responsible to ensure 
the suitability of soil for a swimming pool in the backyard of Lot 8. See Record, 
generally, for absence of any such writing. 
12. Judge Westfall also concluded that the REPC was not silent with regard to the 
risk of loss associated with the placement of additional soil at Lot 8 and concluded that it 
was the obligation of Appellants to properly engineer improvements such as a pool. R. 
1759-1760. 
Terms of the Parties Agreement 
13. The REPC states that "Seller's model homes and promotional materials contain 
optional and extra design features such as floor coverings, decorator light fixtures, wall 
coverings, window treatments, furniture, built-ins, swimming pools or spas, and 
furnishings. Those items shall not be included in Buyer's Home, unless specifically 
ordered and paid for in accordance with Section 7." R. 2047 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at§ 6.4) 
( emphasis added). 
14. The REPC does not contain any requirement that Sun Hill would construct any 
pool or spa at Lot 8 and the Appellants never ordered or paid for Sun Hill to construct a 
pool at Lot 8. R. 2047 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC, generally). 
15. The REPC states the following: 
Although Buyer is entitled to select and Seller shall endeavor to provide the 
Options described above, the Home shall not be constructed as nor deemed 
to be a custom Home. The Home is being constructed as a single structure 
within Seller's production housing development and shall be built 
according to the requirements of the overall development and construction 
12 
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program. Accordingly, Seller reserves the right to, at its sole discretion, 
make changes in tlte plans, specifications, and materials for tlte Home as 
and when Seller deems necessary and appropriate. 
R. 204 7 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at § 8) ( emphasis added). 
16. The REPC defines "Home" as the "[l]ot and improvements" at Lot 8. R. 204 7 
(Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at§ 1.3). 
17. The REPC states that "[a]ll risk of loss to the Property, including physical 
damage or destruction of the Property or its improvements due to any cause except 
ordinary wear and tear and loss caused by a taking in eminent domain, shall be borne by 
Seller until the transaction is closed." R. 2047 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at§ 5.8) (emphasis 
added). 
18. The REPC states further in that same "Risk of Loss" section that "I a]fter 
closing all risk ofloss shall be borne by Buyer, regardless of the date and time Buyer 
takes actual possession of the Home." R. 2047 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at§ 5.8) (emphasis 
added). 
19. The REPC states the following: 
The Sunbrook Development Master Plan, as well as any other development 
plans prepared by Seller, may be amended or changed from time to time to 
provide for changes, modifications, or alterations to ... lot sizes and 
configurations ... or other improvements .... Buyer understands that no 
statement by one of Seller's representatives or any sales associate regarding 
the planned use of the property in or adjacent to Sunbrook should be 
understood by the buyer or anyone as a warranty or promise regarding 
Seller's future development plans. By execution of this agreement and as a 
material inducement to seller to accept Buyer's offer to purchase the 
property, Buyer waives any right to claim any damages, costs, liabilities, 
expenses or obligations against Seller, Seller's officers, employees, agents, 
and subsidiaries for any changes to the Master Plan or any other zoning 
ordinances or development plan for Woodlands. 
13 
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R. 204 7 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at § 11) ( emphasis added). 
20. The REPC states that: 
Buyer [or Appellants] agrees to purchase the Property subject to the 
following additional disclaimers and to release Seller from any liability, and 
to indemnify Seller from any liability, with respect to the following 
enumerated items: ... 14.3 Future improvements by Buyer, including walls, 
fencing, grading, landscaping or excavation work on the Lot which could 
disrupt drainage and/or retention and cause flooding or ponding if not 
correctly engineered (and Buyer ltereby agrees to correctly engineer all 
such future improvements). 
R. 2047 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at§ 14 (emphasis added)). 
21. The REPC states explicitly that "[i]n no event shall Seller [ or Sun Hill] be 
responsible for incidental or consequential damages"4. R. 2047 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at§ 
15.2). 
The Increase of the Size of Lot 8 
22. Prior to 2005 and at the time Lot 8 was subdivided, that lot was prepared and 
graded according to the grading plan prepared by Rosenberg Associates. R. 204 7 (Tr. Ex. 
16, generally); R. 1600 at ,i 27, a copy of such part of the record is attached to Appellant's 
Addendum as Exhibit D; R. 1786 at ,i 28, attached to this Brief in the Addendum as 
Exhibit D. 
4 Sun Hill maintains that the trial judge erred when he awarded joint and several liability; 
however, the ruling by Judge Westfall rendered the requirement to address this aspect of 
Judge Shumate's ruling moot. See Thurston v. Workers Comp. Fund of Utah, 2003 UT 
App 438, P21, 83 P.3d 391 (stating that "Utah law holds that Plaintiffs can only recover 
'general damages, which flow naturally from the breach, and consequential damages, 
which, while not an invariable result of breach, were reasonably foreseeable by the 
parties at the time the contract was entered into."' ( citations omitted)); See A !so R. 1661-
81; See Also R. 1760. 
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23. In 2005, there were "epic floods" on the Santa Clara River, which river borders 
Lot 8. R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, at 16:3 - 17:3 (Dec. 2, 2013)). 
24.Judge Shumate found" ... by a preponderance of the evidence that the 2005 
flood changed what was contemplated by the parties when they entered into [the REPC], 
and that the defendant Sun Hill Homes was required to adapt to those changes. They 
adapted to those changes and had every right to do so under the terms of this 
contract ... ". R. 2044 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. II, 88:9-14 (Dec. 3, 2013)) (emphasis added). 
25. The REPC specifically states that "[Sun Hill] reserves the right to, at its sole 
" discretion, make changes in the plans, specifications, and materials for the Home [ defined 
as the lot and improvements] as and when Seller deems necessary and appropriate." R. 
2047 {Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at§ 8 & 1.3). 
26. Due to the flooding, Sun Hill reasonably used the services provided by the 
Natural Resources Conservation Service Division of the US Department of Agriculture to 
make changes to the grading of Lot 8 and add rock armoring walls to Lot 8 in order to 
protect the lot and home from future flooding. R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 23:1 - 27:25 
(Dec. 3, 2013)); See Also R. 1608 at ,I29; See Also R. 1786 at ,I30. 
2 7. After the pool constructed by Anthony Bros. failed, Jared Hanks, a soils 
engineer, performed soils testing on the soil that the government added to Lot 8, and 
during trial was asked '' ... when the soil in the backyard area of lot 8 was tested, it came 
back 89 to 90 percent?" to which he responded ''[y]es". R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 
v; 182:24- 183:2 (Dec. 2, 2013)). 
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28. When Jared Hanks was asked " ... to what compaction level are backyards 
usually compacted?" he responded by saying that "Landscaping is usually somewhere 
from 85 to 90 percent." R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 160:17-19 (Dec. 2, 2013)). 
29. Jim Nordquist, an expert for both Appellants and Sun Hill, was asked "[i]s it 
customary for backyards and even front yards to be compacted by developers to - in 
excess of 90 percent?" and he replied '"Not very often". R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 
200:23-25 (Dec. 2, 2013)). 
30. Mr. Nordquist testified that compacting a backyard to 95 percent or 90 percent 
would be a "unique situation" and that '"it would be rare" for a developer" ... in a multiple 
lot subdivision such as Woodlands [where Lot 8 is]" to compact backyards to 90 or 95 
percent. See R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 201:7-18 (Dec. 2, 2013)). 
Post-Closing Construction of Pool 
3 1. On or about May 16, 2006, Appellant and Sun Hill "closed" on the sale of the 
home and Lot 8 ("Property" or "Lot 8") and Sun Hill conveyed the Property to Appellants 
by Special Warranty Deed (hereinafter "Warranty Deed") which was recorded on or about 
June 6, 2006. R. 1561 (Pretrial Order, Stipulated and Uncontroverted Facts) at ,I8. 
32. After the property had been deeded to Appellants by Sun Hill, Appellants hired 
Anthony Bros. to construct a pool in the backyard of Lot 8 at the Woodlands (hereinafter 
"Pool"). R. 1561 at ,I9. 
33. Sun Hill did not construct the Pool and the Pool was constructed at the 
Property after Appellants accepted title to the Property. R. 1561 at ,r 11. 
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34. Appellants never had a contract with Sun Hill for Sun Hill to construct the 
Pool. R. 1561 at ,I12. 
35. Prior to signing their agreement with Anthony Bros. for the construction of the 
Pool, Appellant John Mardesich reviewed his contract with Anthony Bros. R. 2043 (Tr. 
Transcr., Vol. I, 81:15-24 (Dec. 2, 2013)). 
36. In the course of reviewing his agreement with Anthony Bros. for the 
construction of the Pool prior to execution of that agreement, Mr. Mardesich came across 
a section of that agreement where the "homeowner ... basically guarantee[ d] that the soil 
~ [in the back yard on Lot 8] was compacted to 90 percent". R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 
81:23 - 82:2 (Dec. 2, 2013)). 
37. Mr. Mardesich told Anthony Bros. that he didn't know what that guarantee 
meant in the agreement with Anthony Bros. and tried to offer the soils report for the 
development (R. 2047 (Tr. Ex. 16)) to Anthony Bros.; the representative of Anthony Bros. 
did not look at or accept a copy of the soils report from Mr. Mardesich. R. 2043 (Tr. 
Transcr., Vol. I, 82:2-13 (Dec. 2, 2013)). 
38. In spite of the requirements of §14 of the REPC, Appellants did not pay a 
licensed engineer to complete proper engineering for the construction of the pool. See R. 
2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 102:23 - 103:6 (Dec. 2, 2013)); See Also R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., 
Vol. I, 60:23 - 61 :4 (Dec. 2, 2013)). 
39. When John Mardesich was asked "[w]ho did you have do the engineering for 
vJ the pool, the spa and the fire pit and the creek?", Mr. Mardesich responded that "Hal 
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Anthony" of Anthony Bros. did the engineering. See R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 102:23 
- 103:6 (Dec. 2, 2013)). 
40. When the Appellant John Mardesich was asked "[ d]id you believe it was your 
responsibility as the homeowner to engineer the pool and the spa and the creek and -", he 
responded that "[ w ]ell, I believe that it was my responsibility to hire a contractor that 
would engineer it, yes." See R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 103:7 - 103:10 (Dec. 2, 2013)). 
41. During the construction of the pool and while the re bar was being placed in the 
pool prior to the application of gunite, Jared Hanks of AGEC noticed the construction of 
the swimming pool and went to Anthony Bros. to disclose potential soils conditions to the 
pool contractor. See R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 159:2-25 (Dec. 2, 2013)). 
42. The reason that Jared Hanks went to tell Anthony Bros., the contractor for the 
pool, about the soil conditions was that he " ... had knowledge that the building pads were 
only prepared to accept the building foundations and then potentially five feet outside the 
building foundations." See R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 159:22-25 (Dec. 2, 2013)). 
43. Mr. Hanks informed Anthony Bros. that the pool they were constructing at 
Appellants' property was being constructed in an area outside of compaction and that 
there could be soil issues with the pool. See R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 160:7-14 (Dec. 
2, 2013)). 
44. The representative of Anthony Bros. responded to Mr. Hanks that he had 
engineers design the reinforcing steel in the pool, but did not engage a soils engineer 
stated that" ... there were never any soil problems prior to engineers being involved." R. 
2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 161 :7-17 (Dec. 2, 2013)). 
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45. Judge Shumate found that Mr. Hanks' testimony that he alerted Anthony Bros. 
to the soils issues at Lot 8 was more credible than Mr. Anthony's denial regarding those 
conversations and found further that Anthony Bros. had knowledge of the issues of the 
soils conditions at Lot 8 while the pool was in the steel framing stage. R. 2044 (Tr. 
Transcr., Vol. II, 84:1-16 (Dec. 3, 2013)). 
46. After completion of the construction of the pool by Anthony Bros., the pool 
and spa experienced significant differential settlement. R. 1562 at ,I12. 
Judge Shumate 's Interpretation of the REPC 
47.Judge Shumate ruled that the REPC or " ... Exhibit No. 1, entered into by the 
parties with all 12 addenda is in fact tlte agreement between tlte parties, that is basically 
uncontroverted, and the exhibit that is in the Court's hands does and is found by the Court 
" to be a full and true and correct copy of that agreement." R. 2044 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. II, 
87:5-10 (Dec. 3, 2013)). 
48. Judge Shumate interpreted the REPC as providing Sun Hill the contractual 
right to alter the grading of Lot 8 and to accept the assistance from the government R. 
2044 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. II, 88:9-14 (Dec. 3, 2013)) (stating that" ... by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the 2005 flood changed what was contemplated by the parties when they 
entered into [the REPC], and that the defendant Sun Hill Homes was required to adapt to 
those changes. They adapted to those changes and had every right to do so under the 
terms of this contract...".). 
49. Judge Shumate then interpreted the REPC in such a way to find that "[ t ]he 
REPC poses a duty on Sun Hill Homes to investigate the suitability of the soil added to 
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Lot 8 for its intended use as a buildable lot for the construction of a swimming pool." R. 
1601 at ,r 3 7. 
50. However, Judge Shumate found that" ... there was no bargain between the 
parties with respect to what liability under Exhibit 1 [the REPC] would apply to that 
change [or the addition of soil]." R. 2044 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. II, 90:18-19 (Dec. 3, 2013)) 
(emphasis added). 
51. In finding there was no "bargain" regarding the placement of soil, Judge 
Shumate stated that "[ w ]here there is no specific understanding of what the contract is 
mean [sic] and what the bargain is meant between the parties when this thousand year 
flood or between 500 and 1,000, maybe it's a 750 year flood if there is such a thing, when 
this occurred no one took the next step to say what are the different circumstances." R. 
2044 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. II, 91:7-12 (Dec. 3, 2013)). 
52. Judge Shumate then said "[i]t may seem somewhat arbitrary for the Court to 
place that risk in the hands of Sunhill [sic], but they were the ones in charge of the lot 
during this period oftime." R. 2044 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. II, 91:13-15 (Dec. 3, 2013)). 
53. Judge Shumate found that the parties did not have an agreement regarding the 
risk of loss associated with the placement of soil at Lot 8. R. 2044 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. II, 
91:13-15 (Dec. 3, 2013)); See Also R. 1601 at if 38. 
54. Judge Shumate found that "[ w ]here there is no express understanding as to the 
changed circumstances, the risk associated with the placement of additional soil is placed 
in the hands of Sun Hill Homes." R. 1601 at ,r 39. 
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Judge Westfa/1 's Correction of Legal Error in Judge Shumate 's Interpretation of the 
REPC and determination that the parties had an agreement regarding the risk of loss 
associated with the placement of soil at Lot 8. 
55. Judge Westfall pointed out that Judge Shumate" ... made no finding that the 
parties ever mutually agreed that Sun Hill would be responsible to ensure the suitability of 
the soil for a swimming pool." R. 1759. 
56. However, Judge Westfall found that Judge Shumate erred in finding that the 
parties had not addressed the risk of loss associated with the placement of additional soil 
at Lot 8. R. 1760. 
57. Judge Westfall determined that "[f]ar from being silent, however, the REPC 
clearly imposes on Plaintiffs the responsibility for proper engineering of an improvement 
such as the swimming pool here." R. 1760 (referring to R. 2047 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at§ 
14.3)). 
58. Judge Westfall also stated that" ... there does not appear to be any reasonable 
basis for finding that Sun Hill had a contractual duty under the REPC to investigate the 
soil's suitability for a swimming pool, particularly when section 14 of the REPC expressly 
allocates to Plaintiffs the responsibility for proper engineering of improvements involving 
excavation, which would include an improvement such as a swimming pool here." R. 
1759. 
59. Judge Westfall then said that "[i]t is unreasonable to circumvent this express 
provision [ section 14] by purporting to fill a void about the risk of loss associated with 
VP placement of additional soil." R. 1760. 
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60. Judge Westfall ruled that " ... the Judgment should be amended to correct the 
legal error that occurred when a contractual duty was imposed on Sun Hill to investigate 
the suitability of the soil for a swimming pool. Absent such duty, there is no basis for 
holding Sun Hill liable for breach of contract...". R. 1760 (emphasis added). 
Sun Hill's Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs 
61. Appellants' claims against Sun Hill were based in, and founded upon, the 
REPC. R. 95- I 06. 
62. Section 15.3 of the REPC provides for mandatory Arbitration5• See R. 
2047 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC, at§ 15.3). 
63. Without requesting or demanding Arbitration, Appellants initiated this 
action against Sun Hill after obtaining permission from the Court to amend its Complaint 
to include Sun Hill. See R. 74-75; See Also R. 95-106. 
64. Sun Hill responded to the Amended Complaint by filing an Answer filed on 
or about August 16, 2010. R. 112-120. 
65. By the actions of Appellants and Sun Hill in filing an Amended Complaint 
and responding with an Answer without requiring Arbitration, each Party waived the 
5 Appellants have not challenged the award of attorneys' fees to Sun Hill based on the 
term of the REPC only permitting an award of fees in arbitration or mediation. Instead, 
the Appellants only basis for arguing that Sun Hill should not be awarded fees is under 
the doctrine of "first breach" where the Appellants claim that Sun Hill breached the 
REPC by allowing the government to add soil and rock walls to Lot 8. This contention is 
made in spite of Judge Shumate's finding that Sun Hill had every right under the contract 
to accept the assistance of the government. See R. 2044 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. II, 88:9-14 
(Dec. 3, 2013)) 
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requirement for mandatory Arbitration in accordance with section 78B-11-105(1) of the 
Utah Code. See R. 95-106; See Also R. 112-120. 
66. The Appellants specifically sought fees in accordance with the contract ( or 
REPC) of the parties. R. 106. 
67. Sun Hill sought fees in its Answer to Appellants Amended Complaint. R. 
119. 
68. The REPC states that "[i]n the event of any arbitration or mediation 
between Seller and Buyer, before or after the Closing, the prevailing party shall be 
entitled to an award of all attorney's fees and costs in an amount to be determined by the 
arbitrator or mediator hearing the matter." R. 204 7 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at § 25). 
69. The REPC states further that "[ a ]ny court or arbitration hearing any matter 
on appeal may also award such fees to the prevailing party in and for any prior mediation 
or arbitration." R. 204 7 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at§ 25). 
70. Both parties have claimed fees in this action under the provision of the 
REPC awarding attorneys' fees and costs to the prevailing party. See R. 1577-79; See 
Also R. 1885-94. 
71. Judge Westfall ruled that" ... I don't find that there's an initial breach by 
SunHill [sic]". See R. 2046 (Hrg. Transcr. 11:6-7 (June 29, 2015)). 
72. Judge Westfall stated further that "[t]hey [or Sun Hill] complied with their 
contractual obligations, so their attorney fees as requested are awarded." See R. 2046 
(Hrg. Transcr. 11: 18-19 (Jun. 29, 2015)). 
Ill 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The REPC is the entire agreement between Appellants and Sun Hill with regard to 
Lot 8. The Appellants stipulated and conceded that the REPC was both integrated and 
unambiguous. Judge Shumate excluded parol evidence during trial and ruled that the 
REPC was" .. .in fact the agreement of the parties ... ". R. 2047 (Tr. Transcr. Vol. II at 
87:5-7 (Dec. 3, 2013)). Sun Hill approached trial and its defense at trial based on the 
rulings of Judge Shumate regarding parol evidence and the integration and unambiguity 
of the REPC. Judge Shumate found that there was no bargain or understanding outside of 
the REPC6• Judge Shumate also found that the REPC permitted Sun Hill to make 
changes to Lot 8 and thus permitted Sun Hill to accept the assistance of the government 
to add soil and rock armoring walls to Lot 8 on the border of the Santa Clara River. 
However, at the conclusion of two days of testimony, Judge Shumate then 
contradicted his own findings regarding the integrated and unambiguous REPC and 
found that the REPC imposed a duty on Sun Hill to investigate the soils added to Lot 8 by c...,, 
the government for the suitability of a pool. In spite of the REPC imposing an explicit 
duty on the Appellants to engineer improvements to Lot 8 and in spite of the homeowner 
understanding that it was his duty to hire a contractor that would properly engineer the 
pool 7, Judge Shumate found that the parties had been silent on the risk of loss associated 
with the addition of the soil. Such a finding is an improper interpretation of the REPC 
and contrary to the finding that that writing is the entire integrated agreement of the 
6 Specifically, Judge Shumate found that with regard to the risk ofloss associated with the 
addition of soil to Lot 8 the parties had no agreement. 
7 See R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 103:7 - 103:10 (Dec. 2, 2013)). 
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parties. Judge Shumate ignored the explicit terms of the REPC and his own rulings, and 
then imposed an additional implied term upon Sun Hill in order to find a purported 
breach under the REPC. 
Judge Westfall agreed with Judge Shumate that that REPC was the entire 
agreement of the parties, but Judge Westfall properly corrected the legal error committed 
by Judge Shumate. The legal error that Judge Shumate committed was that after he had 
concluded that the integrated and unambiguous REPC was " ... in fact the agreement of 
the parties ... " he interpreted this written contract to impose a duty on Sun Hill to 
investigate the suitability of the additional soils on Lot 8 for a pool. The REPC stated 
explicitly that Sun Hill was not constructing the pool at Lot 8. The REPC imposed a duty 
on the Appellants to properly engineer improvements such as the pool. Judge Shumate 
misinterpreted the REPC. Judge Shumate's interpretation directly contradicts the explicit 
terms of the REPC. It is legal error for Judge Shumate to create contract terms that are 
contradictory to the explicit bargain of the parties and which were never agreed upon by 
the parties. 
Judge Westfall also properly corrected another erroneous interpretation of the 
REPC by Judge Shumate. Judge Shumate found that the parties had no bargain regarding 
the risk of loss associated with the addition of soils at Lot 8, when the REPC did in fact 
address such a risk of loss by requiring the Appellants to properly engineer 
improvements. Judge Shumate' s finding that the REPC was silent on this issue was in 
error because the parties had such a bargain within the four comers of the REPC. All risk 
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of loss on the property was to be borne by the Appellants after closing8. As also noted by 
Judge Westfall, "[i]t is unreasonable to circumvent this express provision [section 14, 
which requires the Appellants to properly engineer improvements such as the pool] by 
purporting to fill a void about the risk of loss associated with placement of additional 
soil." Because of the explicit terms of the REPC, Judge Westfall found that Judge 
Shumate improperly found an absence of an agreement regarding the risk of loss where in 
fact there was an agreement. 
It is well within the discretion of the district court under Utah R. Civ. P. 59 to 
amend a judgment entered after a bench trial to correct legal error and where there is 
insufficient evidence to conclude that parties did not have an agreement. Here, Judge 
Westfall agreed with and adhered strictly to the findings of fact of Judge Shumate in the 
context of the finding that the REPC was the only agreement of the parties. Judge 
Shumate never found that the parties had a meeting of the minds outside the explicit 
terms of the REPC (stating that they had no "bargain"). Judge Westfall agreed with and 
adhered to this finding, but, as within his discretion, he corrected legal error regarding the 
interpretation of the parties' agreement, which is the REPC. 
The Appellants argue both that there was an agreement outside the REPC and that 
Sun Hill did not sufficiently marshal evidence for the Rule 59 Motion. Both arguments 
fail. Parol evidence was excluded and the Appellant Mardesich never testified that he 
had an agreement with Sun Hill regarding the investigation of the added soil for a pool. 
Further, Appellants specific Rule 59 Motion did marshal all necessary evidence and 
8 See R. 2047 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at 5.8). 
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··-JP 
Judge Westfall ruled on the Rule 59 Motion after a careful review of Judge Shumate's 
findings, the evidence, and a proper interpretation of the REPC. 
Lastly, Sun Hill is the prevailing party and entitled to fees and costs. Sun Hill 
fulfilled its obligations under the REPC. The Appellants agreed and the Appellant 
Mardesich acknowledged in his testimony that he knew that he had an obligation to 
properly engineer the pool. He did not engineer the pool. The Appellants agreed to 
indemnify Sun Hill under the REPC for improvements that were not properly engineered. 
Instead of this, Appellants brought this action seeking redress for a failed pool that had 
been constructed by a third-party after the Appellants closed on the Property. As a result, 
Judge Westfall properly ruled that Sun Hill is the prevailing party and correctly awarded 
Sun Hill its fees and costs. Sun Hill is also entitled to its fees and costs in defending this 
Appeal. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
Judge Shumate and Judge Westfall both agreed that the REPC was 
the entire agreement between Sun Hill and the Appellants and that 
the REPC was never modified by the parties. 
Judge Shumate found that the REPC was " ... in fact the agreement between the 
parties ... ". R. 2044 (Tr. Transcr. Vol. II at 87:5-7 (Dec. 3, 2013)). Judge Shumate's 
finding came after a stipulation and admission that the REPC was integrated and 
unambiguous. R. 2042 (Hrg. Transcr. 8:24 - 9:1 (Oct. 29, 2013)); R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., 
Vol. I, 9:8 - 10:9 (Dec. 2, 2013)). Judge Westfall accepted the same factual findings as 
Judge Shumate and did not disrupt the finding of Judge Shumate that the REPC was the 
entire agreement of the parties. See R. 1752, generally. 
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The only claim made by Appellants against Sun Hill that remained for trial was 
Appellants' breach of contract claim. R. 2042 (Hrg. Transcr. 19:15-18 (Oct. 29, 2013)). 
A breach of contract claim requires ( 1) a contract, (2) performance by the party seeking 
recovery, (3) breach of the contract by the other party, and (4) damages. Blair v. Axiom 
Design, 2001 UT 20, ,Il4, 20 P.3d 388 (citation omitted). Here, Judge Shumate 
concluded that the only agreement between the parties was the REPC. Judge Shumate 
further made a factual determination that the parties did not have any additional 
"bargain" or understanding outside of the REPC9• Judge Shumate's determination came 
after he had excluded parol evidence during two days of testimony and after Appellants 
conceded and stipulated that the REPC was both integrated and unambiguous. 10 Judge 
Westfall accepted Judge Shumate's finding that REPC is the only agreement of the 
parties. 
The REPC is unambiguous and integrated and requires that any modification to 
the agreement of the parties be in writing and signed by both Appellants and a 
representative of Sun Hill. The Supreme Courts has " ... defined an integrated agreement 
as 'a writing or writings constituting a final expression of one or more terms of an 
agreement."' Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, ~13, 182 P.3d 326 (citations 
omitted). "To determine whether a writing is an integration, a court must determine 
whether the parties adopted the writing 'as the final and complete expression of their 
9 See R. 2044 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. II, at 90:18-19 (Dec. 3, 2013)); See Also R. 2044 (Tr. 
Transcr., Vol. II, at 91:7-12 (Dec. 3, 2013)). 
10 See R. 2046 (Tr. Transcr. Vol. II at 87:5-7 (Dec. 3, 2013)); See Also R. 2042 (Hrg. 
Transcr. at 8:24- 9:1 (Oct. 29, 2013)); See Also R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, at 9:24 -
10:4 (Dec. 2, 2013)). 
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bargain.'" Id. Here, the REPC itself contains an integration clause and requires that any 
changes or modifications be in writing and signed by both parties. R. 204 7 (Tr. Ex. 1, 
REPC at § 29). This aspect of the agreement was well understood by the Appellants as 
they entered into twelve (12) separate addenda to the original contract that were all in 
writing and signed. 
Where a contract is integrated, parol evidence is only admissible to clarify 
ambiguous terms and is not admissible to vary or contradict clear and unambiguous terms 
of an agreement. See Tangren, 2008 UT at 'j!'j! 11-12. The Appellants conceded during 
the hearing on Sun Hill's Motion for Summary Judgment that the REPC is unambiguous. 
R. 2042 (Hrg. Transcr. 8:24 -9:1 (Oct. 29, 2013)). Judge Shumate excluded parol 
evidence during the trial and never concluded that the REPC contained any ambiguities. 
Not only did Judge Shumate not admit or allow any parol evidence about modifying the 
REPC, Judge Shumate explicitly concluded that there was no additional understanding or 
bargain between Appellants and Sun Hill outside of the REPC 11 • 
The integrated and unambiguous REPC states that "[t]his Agreement cannot be 
changed, amended, or altered without the written agreement of Buyer and Seller, which 
written agreement must be signed by Buyer and an authorized representative of Seller." 
R. 2047 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at§ 29) (emphasis added). The Appellants did not present any 
writing at trial that was signed by either the Appellants or the Buyer which imposed a 
duty on Sun Hill to investigate the suitability of soils added to Lot 8 by the government 
for the suitability of a pool. There was no testimony, either admitted or countenanced by 
11 See R. 2044 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. II, 90:18-19 & 91 :7-12 (Dec. 3, 2013)). 
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Judge Shumate, that the REPC was modified 12• This body of addenda and the original 
agreement are integrated and unambiguous and were never further modified to place a 
burden regarding investigating the soil added by the government for the suitability of a 
pool on Sun Hill. Judge Westfall reiterated that Judge Shumate did not find any_ 
agreement between Sun Hill and the Appellants other than the REPC when he found: 
... Judge Shumate made no finding that the parties ever mutually agreed that 
Sun Hill would be responsible to ensure the suitability of the soil for a 
swimming pool. He only found that Sun Hill was aware of Plaintiffs' 
intention to build a swimming pool in their backyard, ... and that the 
absence of any agreement between the parties as to '[t]he risk ofloss 
associated with the placement of as much as fifteen feet of additional soil 
on Lot 8' resulted in such risk being 'placed in the hands of Sun Hill 
Homes.' 
R. 17 59 ( emphasis in original). 
In short, both Judge Shumate and Judge Westfall concluded that the REPC was "in 
fact" the entire agreement of the parties. It is integrated and unambiguous and is the final 
expression of the parties' entire agreement with regard to the purchase of Lot 8 from Sun 
Hill. 
II. Appellants conceded, stipulated, and agreed that the REPC is 
integrated and unambiguous and should now be precluded from 
arguing that Sun Hill and Appellants had any other agreement. 
At the hearing on Sun Hill's Motion for Summary Judgment, Appellants conceded 
that the REPC was unambiguous by stating " ... this is undisputed, and both parties agree 
that the REP-C [sic] is unambiguous." R. 2042 (Hrg. Transcr. at 8:24 - 9: 1 (Oct. 29, 
12 The Appellants and Sun Hill executed twelve ( 12) written addenda to the REPC 
changing or modifying certain terms contained in the original contract, but none of these 
addenda addressed the addition of the soil to Lot 8. 
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2013)). During trial, counsel for Sun Hill objected to parol evidence. Counsel for 
Appellants were then asked by Judge Shumate "[ c ]ounsel, is there some ambiguity in the 
contract that would justify the Court looking at the parol in any way, shape, or form?"; 
and counsel for Appellants responded that "[y ]our Honor, as far as the integration in the 
contract, there isn't, although that's not where I'm going with this." R. 2043 (Tr. 
Transcr., Vol. I, at 9:24 - 10:4 (Dec. 2, 2013)). 
Because of this stipulation and concession that the REPC was both integrated and 
unambiguous, together with Judge Shumate's exclusion of parol evidence, Sun Hill 
proceeded at trial with evidence and witnesses based on the need to remain within the 
four comers of the REPC. Now, in contradiction to Judge Shumate's rulings and 
Appellants stipulation and concessions, Appellants try to argue that there is an agreement 
between the parties other than the REPC. Such an argument should be precluded by this 
Court based on the rulings and stipulation and admissions at Judge Westfall. See State v. 
Santonio, 2011 UT App 385, ~29, 265 P.3d 822 (stating that "trial courts [are not 
required] to imagine all reasonable offshoots of the argument actually presented to them 
before making a ruling .... [and citing another case that] explain[s] that the preservation 
rule prevents parties not only from raising new issues on appeal, but also from raising 
new arguments on appeal) ( citations omitted)). Here, the Appellants and Sun Hill tried 
this case as a contract case based on a written agreement which Appellants conceded and 
stipulated that it was integrated and unambiguous. Allowing them to now argue that 
there is another agreement between the parties would be improper and would allow new 
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arguments that are not supported by the evidence and which are wholly inconsistent with 
Appellants trial position. 
III. Judge Westfall properly concluded that the REPC imposes a 
contractual obligation on the Appellants to "properly engineer" 
improvements such as the pool constructed by Anthony Bros and 
that Appellants failed to perform this obligation. 
Regardless of the compaction of the soils added to Lot 8 by the government 13, the 
REPC imposed a duty on the Appellants to properly engineer the pool constructed by 
Anthony Bros. The REPC explicitly states that the Appellants" ... hereby agrees to 
correctly engineer all such future improvements [including excavation work]". R. 2047 
(Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at§ 14). The Appellant John Mardesich testified that he" ... believe[d] 
that it was [his] responsibility to hire a contractor that would engineer [the pool], yes.'' 
See R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, l 03 :7 - 103: IO (Dec. 2, 2013)). In spite of the explicit 
requirement of the REPC for all excavation at the Property to be properly engineered, the 
pool was not properly engineered and the pool settled. 
Judge Shumate found that the REPC was silent with regard to the risk of loss 
associated with the addition of soil to Lot 8. However, Judge Westfall correctly 
interpreted the REPC to find that the REPC was not silent with regard to that risk of loss. 
'
3 There was no evidence at trial that the soil added by the government to Lot 8 did not 
meet industry standards. When the expert Jared Hanks was asked " ... when the soil in the 
backyard area of lot 8 was tested, it came back 89 to 90 percent?", he responded "[y ]es". 
R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. I, 182:24- 183:2 (Dec. 2, 2013)). When Mr. Hanks was 
asked" ... to what compaction level are backyards usually compacted?" he responded by 
saying that "Landscaping is usually somewhere from 85 to 90 percent." R. 2043 (Tr. 
Transcr., Vol. I, 160:17-19 (Dec. 2, 2013)). The expert witness Jim Nordquist regarding 
backyard fill was that backyards are often compacted less than 90%. R. 2043 (Tr. 
Transcr., Vol. I, 200:23-25 Dec. 2, 2013)). 
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Instead, Judge Westfall found, the REPC is "far from being silent" and does impose on 
Appellants the duty for proper engineering of an improvement such as the swimming 
pool. R. 1760. Judge Westfall also concluded that it is " ... unreasonable to c~rcumvent 
this express provision by purporting to fill a void about the risk of loss associated with 
the placement of additional soil." R. 1760. 
As stated above, a breach of contract claim requires performance by the party 
seeking recovery. Blair, 2001 UT at 114 (citation omitted). Here, it is uncontroverted 
that the Appellants failed to properly engineer the pool for the soils at Lot 8. It is 
uncontroverted that the Appellant knew that it was his obligation to hire someone to 
properly engineer the pool. Yet, in spite of the explicit contractual requirements, and the 
Appellant's knowledge of this requirement, the pool was not properly engineered 14• As 
such, there is a breach by the Appellant of the REPC requiring that improvements, such 
as the pool, be "properly engineered'~. Due to this breach, the Appellants cannot and did 
not meet the second element of a breach of contract claim requiring "performance by 
party seeking recovery." Blair, 2001 UT at P14. Judge Westfall correctly found that this 
contractual obligation regarding engineering the pool placed the risk of loss on the 
Appellants and ruled in Sun Hill's favor. 
Ill 
Ill 
Ill 
14 Anthony Bros. was put on notice of the soil conditions and potential lack of 
compaction, and yet Anthony Bros. disregarded such information and failed to properly 
engineer the pool for such soil conditions. 
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IV. Judge Westfall properly concluded that the REPC does not impose 
a duty on Sun Hill to investigate the suitability of the soil added to 
Lot 8 for a pool. 
After finding that the REPC was the agreement of the parties and concluding that 
there was no other agreement between the Appellants and Sun Hill, Judge Shumate stated 
that: 
[i]t's the Court's position that the reasonable interpretation of the contract, 
the REP-C [sic], Exhibit 1, would impose a duty upon Sunhill [sic] to make ~ 
investigation as to the utility of this additional buildable area on the lot 
because this was a different lot than they bound themselves under the 
contract and placed the burden, the risk of loss that might arise on that 
when the lot changed. . .. [i]t may seem somewhat arbitrary for the Court to 
place that risk in the hands of Sunhill [sic], but they were the ones in charge ~ 
of the lot during this period of time." 
R. 2044 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. II, 90:6-12 & 91:13-15 (Dec. 3, 2013)). 
As pointed out by Judge Westfall, a " ... court can only supply reasonable [implied- l:i... 
in-law] terms to supplement a contract which is silent." R. 1760 (citing Ross v. Epic 
Eng'g, PC, 2013 UT App 136,114 n.4, 307 P.3d 576 (add'l citations omitted)) (emphasis 
added). Judge Shumate found that the REPC was silent regarding the risk of loss 
associated with the additional soil the government placed on Lot 8. However, Judge 
Shumate found that the parties never mutually agreed to any specific terms regarding the 
placement of the soil. As such, Judge Shumate found that the REPC contained implied-
at-law terms instead of mutually agreed upon terms 15• 
15 If Judge Shumate concluded that the REPC does impose a duty on Sun Hill to 
investigate the suitability of the soil for a pool based on some statements of the parties 
and not through implied-at-law terms in the REPC, then the trial judge improperly relied 
on parol evidence that he excluded during the trial. See Garrett v. Ellison, 93 Utah 184, 
188, 72 P.2d 449 (Utah 1937) (stating that "Parol evidence is inadmissible to vary, alter, 
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Judge Westfall corrected the error of Judge Shumate by pointing out that the 
REPC was not silent on the risk of loss associated with additional soil placed on Lot 8 by 
the government. Judge Westfall found instead that the REPC imposed an explicit duty on 
the Appellants to engineer the pool that they chose to have Anthony Bros. construct at 
Lot 8. Here, Judge Westfall concluded that Judge Shumate never found that the parties 
ever mutually agreed that Sun Hill would be responsible to ensure the suitability of the 
soil for a swimming pool. R. 1759. Judge Westfall pointed out that Judge Shumate only 
found that the parties did not have an agreement regarding the investigation of the 
suitability of the soil for a pool. 
This finding by Judge Westfall regarding Judge Shumate's finding is wholly 
consistent with the trial transcripts and the written judgment of Judge Shumate. Judge 
Shumate ruled that the REPC " ... is in fact the agreement between the parties, that is 
basically uncontroverted ... ". R. 2044 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. II, 87:5-10 (Dec. 3, 2013)). 
Judge Shumate found that" ... there was no bargain between the parties with respect to 
what liability under Exhibit 1 [the REPC] would apply to that change [or the addition of 
soil]." R. 2044 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. II, 90:18-19 (Dec. 3, 2013)) (emphasis added). In 
finding there was no "bargain" regarding the placement of soil, Judge Shumate stated that 
"[w]here there is no specific understanding of what the contract is mean [sic] and what 
the bargain is meant between the parties when this thousand year flood or between 500 
and 1,000, maybe it's a 750 year flood if there is such a thing, when this occurred no one 
control, or contradict the terms of a written instrument, in an action founded upon such 
writing, between the parties or privies thereto."). 
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took the next step to say what are the different circumstances." R. 2044 (Tr. Transcr., 
Vol. II, 91 :7-12 (Dec. 3, 2013)). Judge Shumate concluded that H ••• the 2005 flood 
changed what was contemplated by the parties when they entered into [the REPC], and 
that the defendant Sun Hill Homes was required to adapt to those changes. They adapted 
to those changes and had every right to do so under the terms of this contract ... ". R. 
2044 (Tr. Transcr., Vol. II, 88:9-14 (Dec. 3, 2013)) (emphasis added). 
Judge Shumate found that "[ w ]here there is no express understanding as to the 
changed circumstances, the risk associated with the placement of additional soil is placed 
in the hands of Sun Hill Homes." R. 1601, at 139. Thus, Judge Shumate imposed 
"implied-at-law" terms into the REPC. Judge Shumate erred in concluding that the 
REPC was in fact silent on this issue of the added soils. First, the REPC did address risk 
of loss and placed it squarely on the Appellants in section 5.8 of the REPC. Second, the 
REPC required the Appellants to properly engineer "[t]uture improvements", such as a 
pool, under section 14.3. Third, the Appellant acknowledged in his own testimony that 
he knew he had the obligation to have the pool engineered. Because of the explicit terms 
of the REPC, which Appellant knew and understood, finding that the REPC is silent on 
the risk of loss regarding the soil fails to acknowledge the actual written agreement of the 
parties and is in error. As such, Judge Westfall did not abuse his discretion in finding 
that Judge Shumate erred by concluding that the integrated and unambiguous agreement 
of the parties did not address the risk of loss associated with a pool that was constructed 
by Anthony Bros. and which was not properly engineered. Judge Westfall' s ruling in 
correcting the error of Judge Shumate with regard to the implied-at-law terms is 
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reasonable given the other rulings of Judge Shumate regarding the integration and 
completeness of the REPC as the parties' agreement. See Smith, 2003 UT at ,25 (stating 
that "we will reverse only if there is no reasonable basis for the [Rule 59] decision." 
( citation omitted). 
V. There is no factual basis for Appellants' argument that there was 
an agreement between the parties regarding the use of the backyard 
as a "buildable area"; such an argument requires an improper 
modification of the REPC. 
Appellants state in their Brief, at statement of fact number 28, that "[p ]ursuant to 
conversations between Mr. Mardesich and Sun Hill's agent, Mr. Roger Stratford, it was 
agreed and understood that the level portion of the back yard area was increased and that 
the entire level portion of the backyard area was able to be used as a buildable area." 
Brief of Appellant, p. 9, Statement of Fact 28. This statement incorrectly characterizes 
the testimony of the Appellant and the record. The part of the transcript that Appellant 
cites to support this "statement of fact" actually states: "[ s ]o after that discussion with 
Roger Stratford, was it your understanding that the entire level portion of your yard 
would be able to be used as buildable area for backyard improvements?" To which, Mr. 
Mardesich responded "Yes.". R. 2043 (Tr. Transcr. Vol. I, 54:17-21 (Dec. 2, 2013)). 
Mr. Mardesich does not actually state that it was "agreed and understood" and 
never actually testified that he had any agreement with Sun Hill other than the REPC. 
Mr. Mardesich never testified that he had a verbal agreement with Sun Hill regarding the 
suitability of the soil in the backyard for a pool or a verbal modification of the REPC. 
His understanding that the area where the soil had been added could be used for 
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improvements does not support a conclusion that there ever was a meeting of the minds 
between him and Sun Hill regarding the imposition of a duty on Sun Hill to investigate 
the suitability of the soils. Indeed, if Mr. Mardesich had attempted to testify that he had 
verbal discussions with Sun Hill regarding an agreement of the parties other than the 
REPC or verbal discussion that altered the REPC, counsel for Sun Hill would have 
objected as to parol evidence and, based on the prior ruling of Judge Shumate, such 
testimony would have been excluded. 
The REPC requires that "[t]his Agreement cannot be changed, amended, or altered 
without the written agreement of Buyer and Seller~ which written agreement must be 
signed by Buyer and an authorized representative of Seller." R. 204 7 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at 
§ 29). Under the Statute of Frauds, "[ e ]very contract for the leasing for a longer period 
than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void unless 
the contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party 
by whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in 
writing." U.C.A. § 25-5-3. Here, the Appellants understood that all changes to the 
REPC had to be in writing and signed as is evidence by the twelve (12) addenda executed 
by the Appellants for Lot 8. See R. 2047 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC, generally). 
Further, it is unreasonable that the Appellant believed that the REPC had been 
modified to impose the duty of ensuring the suitability of the added soil upon Sun Hill 
because the Appellant himself testified that "[he] believe[ d] that it was [his] 
responsibility to hire a contractor that would engineer [the pool], yes." See R. 2043 (Tr. 
Transcr., Vol. I, 103:7 - 103:10 (Dec. 2, 2013)). Appellants brief fails to capture the 
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actual testimony, tenor, and findings during trial. Judge Shumate did not conclude that 
there was any agreement other than the REPC. As such, there is no agreement between 
Appellants and Sun Hill other than the REPC and there is no factual or legal basis for 
finding such an agreement. 
VI. Appellants' argument that Sun Hill did not properly marshal 
evidence16 for its Rule 59 Motion fails to recognize the nature of Sun 
Hill's Rule 59 Motion. 
Appellants attempts to argue that Sun Hill has failed to properly marshal the 
evidence in its Motion for New Trial. Appellants cites to Harris v. JES Assocs. to support 
their argument. 2003 UT App 112, 69 P.3d 297. However, Appellants have 
misunderstood the tenor of this case, the evidence needing to be marshaled, and the 
evidence actually marshaled. Harris states that "[i]n order to properly discharge the duty 
of marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious 
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very 
findings the appellant resists." 2003 UT App at 139 (emphasis added). 
The Rule 59 Motion was based on Sun Hill resisting very specific findings of 
Judge Shumate. Sun Hill resisted the contradictory findings of Judge Shumate that (a) on 
the one hand the REPC is integrated and unambiguous and the agreement of the parties, 
and (b) on the other hand that Judge Shumate inserted a contradictory term that he said 
16 Appellants have argued that Sun Hill failed to marshal evidence. However, Appellants 
now challenge the finding of Judge Shumate that there was no meeting of the minds or 
bargain outside of the REPC and yet Appellants fail to marshal all evidence in support of 
Judge Shumate's conclusion. 
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did not exist in the agreement 17• In addition, Sun Hill resisted the contradictory findings 
that ( c) on the one hand Anthony Bros. knew of possible soil problems with the 
Appellants' backyard and was the contractor that actually constructed the pool that 
ultimately failed and (d) on the other hand awardingjoint and several liability against Sun 
Hill 18• With regard to these specific contradictory findings, Sun Hill did marshal all 
necessary evidence. 
During the proceedings, Judge Shumate ruled that the REPC was integrated and 
unambiguous and Appellants conceded and stipulated the same. As a result, Sun Hill 
presented a case based on the explicit terms of the REPC. Had Judge Shumate ruled 
during the trial that the REPC was ambiguous or that it was not integrated, then Sun Hill 
would have presented a very different case at trial including presenting additional 
testimony regarding evidence outside the four comers of the REPC. But this was not the 
finding of Judge Shumate and Sun Hill did not challenge Judge Shumate's ruling that the 
REPC was integrated and unambiguous in its Rule 59 Motion. On the contrary, Sun Hill 
agrees with the Court's ruling that the REPC was integrated and unambiguous and "in 
fact the agreement" of the parties. As a result, Sun Hill need not cull through every scrap 
of evidence that could point to an ambiguity in the contract or that it was not integrated. 
Because Sun Hill is not challenging the ruling of Judge Shumate that the REPC is 
17 Specifically, Judge Shumate added a term to the REPC that Sun Hill had to ensure the 
suitability of the backyard for a pool even though the REPC was silent with regard to any 
obligation with regard to a pool, clearly provided Sun Hill the opportunity to change the 
lot specifications and plans, and required the Appellants to engineer the pool. 
18 Judge Westfall's ruling renders the latter portion of the Rule 59 Motion regarding joint 
and several liability moot, but the issue was raised, briefed, and properly marshalled in 
the district court. 
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integrated and unambiguous and the agreement of the parties, Sun Hill need not marshal 
evidence that would contradict this ruling. 
However, Sun Hill did challenge Judge Shumate's ruling that the REPC was silent 
as to the obligations of the parties as it related to the additional soil and the requirement 
to engineer improvements. Because the REPC is integrated and unambiguous, it may be 
interpreted as a matter oflaw. See Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985) 
(stating that "[a] contract's interpretation may be either a question of law, determined by 
the words of the agreement, or a question of fact, determined by extrinsic evidence of 
intent." ( citation omitted)). Judge Shumate' s addition of a term to the agreement 
appeared to be based on some reliance on parol evidence or, as Judge Westfall pointed 
out, based on an implied-at-law term. The REPC is not silent or ambiguous on the risk of 
loss associated with the pool constructed by Anthony Bros. and thus any additional term 
added by Judge Shumate is in error. Sun Hill properly marshalled evidence and Judge 
Westfall ruled accordingly. 
VII. Sun Hill is entitled to its fees and costs in defending this action and 
this appeal. 
"In Utah, attorney fees may be awarded 'if authorized by statute or by contract."' 
Crowley v. Black, 2007 UT App 245,112, 167 P.3d 1087 (citing Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). Here, the REPC provides the following: 
In the event of any arbitration or mediation between Seller and Buyer, 
before or after the Closing, the prevailing party shall be entitled to an award 
of all attorney's fees and costs in an amount to be determined by the 
arbitrator or mediator hearing the matter. Any court or arbitration hearing 
any matter on appeal may also award such fees to the prevailing party in 
and for any prior mediation or arbitration. 
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R. 2047 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at§ 25). 
The Appellants initiated legal action and waived the mandatory arbitration 
provision of the REPC. See U.C.A. § 78B-1 l-105 (authorizing waiver of mandatory 
arbitration). In addition, both Appellants and Sun Hill have sought their fees in this 
action and the Appellants have not argued that fees are not appropriate because this 
matter was litigated instead of arbitrated. Judge Westfall determined that Sun Hill is the 
prevailing party and awarded Sun Hill its reasonable fees 19• "In certain circumstances, a 
court may easily determine which party is the prevailing party. For example, '[w]here a 
plaintiff sues for money damages, and plaintiff wins, plaintiff is the prevailing party; if 
defendant successfully defends and avoids adverse judgment, defendant has prevailed."' 
Crowley v. Black, 2007 UT App 245,112, 167 P.3d 1087 (citingR.T. Nielson Co. v. 
Cook, 2002 UT 11, ,23, 40 P.3d 1119). 
Appellants sued Sun Hill and the only claim of Appellant against Sun Hill that 
remained for trial was Appellants breach of contract claim. Sun Hill, as the defendant, 
successfully avoided an adverse judgment. As such, under Crowley and R. T. Nielson, 
Sun Hill is the prevailing party and entitled to its fees. Appellants contend that Sun Hill 
breached the REPC first. This is not the case. Judge Shumate found that Sun Hill 
modified the lot " ... and had every right to do so under the terms of this contract". R. 
2044 (Tr. Transcr. 88:12-15). Judge Westfall found that the Appellants actually breached 
their obligations under section 14 of the REPC by failing to have the pool properly 
19 Appellants did not challenge the reasonableness of the fees and costs of Sun Hill. See 
R. 1939. 
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engineered. As such, there is no breach by Sun Hill under Blair because there was not 
performance by Appellants. Sun Hill prevailed and is entitled to its attorneys' fees and 
costs accrued in trying this case. 
In addition, because the REPC explicitly states that "[a]ny court or arbitration 
hearing any matter on appeal may also award such fees to the prevailing party in and for 
any prior mediation or arbitration," Sun Hill is entitled to all of its fees in defending this 
appeal. See R. 204 7 (Tr. Ex. 1, REPC at § 25). 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Shumate never found that the REPC had been modified. Judge Shumate 
found that Sun Hill had every right under the REPC to accept the assistance of the 
government to add soil and rock walls to Lot 8 to armor and protect it from future 
flooding. Judge Shumate found that the parties did not have any other agreement, 
bargain, or understanding regarding Lot 8. Judge Shumate then erred by inferring that 
there was an implied term in the REPC that did impose a duty on Sun Hill to investigate 
the added soil for the suitability of that soil for a pool. Judge Westfall corrected this error 
and ruled that the REPC was '"far from silent" on this issue and instead clearly imposed a 
duty on Appellants to properly engineer the pool, which they did not. Judge Westfall 
corrected the legal error of Judge Shumate and ruled that the REPC did not impose a duty 
on Sun Hill to investigate the soils for suitability of the pool and that therefore, Sun Hill 
had not breached the REPC. Because of this, Judge Westfall ruled that Sun Hill was the 
prevailing party and properly awarded attorneys' fees and costs to Sun Hill. For the 
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foregoing reasons, the appeal should be dismissed and the district's court judgment 
against Appellants upheld. 
/},ttf; 
DATED this .k2- day of April, 2016. 
44 
DUNN LAW FIRM 
LIFFORD V. DUNN 
ADAMC.DUNN 
Attorneys for Appellee Sun Hill Homes 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
UTAH R. APP. P. 24(t)(l) 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing Brief of Appellee contains 
12,756 words, based on the word count of the word processing system used to prepare the 
brief. The word count is exclusive of the table of contents, table of citations, and any 
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Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the 
following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action 
tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, 
take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make 
new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or 
any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(a)(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding 
on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination 
by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the 
affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(a)(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(a)(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the 
application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law. 
(a)(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 
14 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made 
under Subdivision (a)(1 ), (2), (3), or (4 ), it shall be supported by affidavit. 
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served 
with the motion. The opposing party has 14 days after such service within which 
to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing 
affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period not 
exceeding 21 days either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties by 
written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
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{d) On initiative of court. Not later than 14 days after entry of judgment the 
court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it might 
have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the 
grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 14 days after entry of the judgment. 
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1 testimony that Sunhill presents is that at some point prior to 
2 closing on this lot they had the backyard graded to plan. 
3 Mr, Dunn referenced that Mr. Mardesich said it was graded to 
4 plan. I believe that's inconsistent with his affidavit. He said 
5 it had a steeper slope. He had never seen the plan prior to 
6 this, and wouldn't have known whether that was consistent with 
7 the plan or not. 
8 That brings us back to the issue when this case started 
9 out, your Honor, it started out as a well, you didn't compact the 
10 backyard to 90 percent, which according to all these different 
11 documents, there's n.o area within the site -- and it's important 
12 to recognize that while the -- while Sunhill asserts that this 
13 investigation by AGEC in 2004 was limited only to the building 
14 pads, the report itself on page 3 says, "A field investigation 
15 was conducted on the subject site to obtain information on the 
16 subsurface conditions and obtain samples for laboratory testing.n 
17 
18 
Figure 2 is the site plan for that investigation, and that 
includes all of the lots 1 through 17. 
19 So I believe that the -- to narrowly classify this as 
20 an investigation only to the building lots may have been what 
21 Sunhill thought it was, but according to the language within the 
22 report itself, it's not so limited. It's a broader thing. 
23 THE COURT: More than just the building footprint. 
24 MR. SPENDLOVE: Correct, because the REP-C itself -- and 
25 this is undisputed, and both parties agree that the REP-C is 
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unambiguous. The REP-C itself refers to the home or the property 
as the lot and the improvements, and that's a quote out of -- I 
had it here, but I kind of don't have it in front of me right 
now, but both parties have cited the same language stating that 
that is what was done. 
So when this started, it was an issue of well, all these 
reports say you didn't compact the soil in the backyard to the 90 
percent like you were supposed to. Defendants make a big issue 
of well, the REP-C doesn't refer to a swimming pool. Plaintiffs 
have never said that it did. It just so happens that 90 percent 
is the same, the subgrade recornpaction for the fill, according 
12 to AGEC, needed to be to 90 percent. The site grading fill, 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
according to Rosenberg, needed to be to 90 percent, and to build 
the pool it needed to bo to 90 percent. It's just whether happy 
or unhappy, it's a coincidence that that number is the same. 
THE COORT: Counsel, what do you want to tell me about 
what Mr. Dunn referred to, and that's an apparent shifting of 
responsibilities and liabilities from buyer to -- or seller to 
19 buyer for anything that isn't the house. That's the position 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
he's taking. How do you read that language? 
MR. SPENDLOVE: Your Honor, I don't believe that's true 
because it's not just the house. As I said, the REP-C refers to 
both the lot and the .improvements on it, and so the lot is 
required to comply with the building plan. As I was getting to, 
the -- we originally thought it was just a compaction issue, but 
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1 has the ability to recognize undisputed facts. We would ask the 
2 Court to do that so as to minimize any length of trial. There's 
3 a significant number of facts which are undisputed between the 
4 parties, and simply 
5 T!IE COURT: And whether those facts are undisputed, 
6 Counsel, that would be part of a pre-trial order. Just making 
7 sure that the finder of fact is not swamped with a tidal wave 
8 when really we have a fairly good sized swimming pool 
9 
10 
(inaudible). All right. Thank you. 
MR. SPENDLOVE: Your Honor, if you have any other 
11 questions in regards to that, as I said, the basis for this is 
12 like I said, clarify there's a difference between structural fill 
13 and subgrade fill. Sunhill Homes hasn't recognized that, and 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
also Sunhill had the obligation to hand this lot and house -- not 
the house -- over in its appropriate condition, and they did just 
not. 
THE COURT: Okay. I appreciate that. Mr. Dunn, I'm 
going to grant your motion for summary judgment as to the 
19 material non-disclosure and intentional fraud claims, and also as 
20 to the breach of good faith and fair dealing, but the contract 
21 claims made by plaintiffs survive. Those will still be there. 
22 Mr. Berrett, let's give you a chance to talk with your side of 
23 
24 
25 
it. Go right.ahead, Counsel. I'll pull up your memorandum here. 
MR. BERRETT: If not, I've got a copy here. 
THE COURT: I've got it right here in the database, 
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THF. COURT: And it ain't moving. 
MR. SPENDLOVE: It's (inaudible) okay. 
THE COURT: Yes. I have full right, title and interest 
4 of that one right there. Nobody is going to contest it. 
5 MR. SPENDLOVE: Thank you, your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: If it goes, heads will roll. So it will be 
7 here. Feel free to contact the clerk's office so you can get 
8 some time to come in and work with the interface and make sure 
9 you understand how the programs operate to get it up on the 
10 screen for your witnesses. Anything else the Court can help with 
11 as far as the pre-trial issues? Mr. Dunn? 
12 MR. DUNN: Yes, your Honor. I understood your ruling. 
13 There also is a claim from the plaintiff of unjust enrichment. 
14 
15 
THE COURT: That's gone, too, Counsel. 
MR. DUNN: Okay. So we're faced with just the claim of 
16 breach of contract. 
17 THE COURT: It's a breach of contract case. That's the 
18 way I see it. 
19 MR. DUNN: Thank you, your Honor. 
20 THE COUR'r: Gentlemen, I'll let you go ahead and do the 
21 typing. Let's get it put together and be ready for trial on 
22 December 2. Thank you. 
23 MR. DUNN: Thank you, your Honor. 
24 MR. Sl?ENDLOVE: Thank you, your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: We'll be in recess. 
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rule from the bench, 
(Noon recess) 
COURT BAILIFF: All rise. The Court will now continue 
in session. You may be seated. 
THE COURT: Thank you, everyone. We're back on the 
record in Mardesich vs. Anthony Brothers Construction and Sunhill 
Homes. The Court having heard the testimony of the parties and 
having reviewed the evidence, both the testimonial evidence as 
well as the written documents is prepared to make findings of 
fact. 
Counsel, we will rely on first and foremost as findings 
of fact those uncontroverted facts that are contained within the 
Court's pre-trial order signed on the 29 th of November of 2013. 
Paragraphs 1 through 15 are included in the Court's findings of 
fact, and in my analysis and ruling from the bench, I will 
concentrate first on the issue between plaintiffs and Anthony 
Brothers Construction. 
The Court finds specifically that at the time that 
Mr. Mardesich contacted Dave from Anthony Brothers Construction, 
he had in his possession the soils report, which has been 
received in evidence, and that he offered that to Anthony 
Brothers representative, but it was not accepted by Anthony 
Brothers for any purpose. 
The Court finds that at that time Anthony Brothers was 
placed on notice that there were soils issues with respect to 
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this building site. The Court also finds that while the pool was 
in its steel framing stage -- and when I say steel framing, I 
should be more specific, the rebar stage before gunite was 
installed, that Mr. Hanks then of ACEG -- AGEC, Yeah, I've got 
it wrong, AGEC, noticed the site and went to Anthony Brothers 
representatives on site and again disclosed to them the issues of 
the soils conditions and his knowledge of the soils reports and 
those concerns. 
I find these by the requisite burden of proof, and so 
that you know, Mr, Anthony, the Court has the responsibility of 
weighing the testimony of the witnesses. If I am convinced by 
only the slightest tilting of those scales of justice, I make the 
findings accordingly here, This is not a case where a serious 
burden of proof is required, but only a preponderance of the 
evidence, and I am more convinced by Mr, Hanks's testimony than I 
am by yours, Mr. Anthony. 
The same general timing goes to the allegation that 
Mr. Mardesich made representations that the lot was quote, 
•pool ready,n close quote. I simply am not persuaded that 
Mr, Mardesich made such a statement in his interactions with 
Anthony Brothers. 
There is a provision within the Anthony Brothers 
contract, which has been received and which the Court has as 
Exhibit No. 31 that purports to create a statute of limitations 
of a one year time period in which the action on this contract 
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must be brought, However, the court is not persuaded as Anthony 
Brothers argues, not persuaded by the preponderance of the 
evidence that this action was filed outside of the one year 
limitation contained within the contract. 
In addition, I'll just note this parenthetically. It's 
not necessary for the Court's decision, but the Court isn't very 
certain that such a limited statute of limitations built within a 
contract is necessarily favored by public policy concerns. 
The Court is also persuaded by the evidence and the 
testimony of the experts, the expert report, that while as 
Anthony Brothers accurately points out that at the time of the 
preparation of the report that the slippage on the swimming pool 
was only 1.2 inches, and at 1 inch is within industry standards, 
as testified to by the expert. 
The Court is persuaded that at the time of the expert 
report was prepared that there was that much slippage, but the 
Court is also equally persuaded that the potential for continued 
motion and continued movement is more than likely, and that 
certainly the spa has tilted out of the industry standard of 1 
inch, it haven't settled by 1.9 inches as opposed to the only 1.2 
inches on the pool. 
The other issue that bears on the statute of limitations 
clause in the Anthony Brothers contract is the circumstance in 
which the Court finds that Mr. Mardesich did indeed attempt to 
contact Anthony Brothers regarding his concerns with this matter 
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at least 60 times without response, and that Anthony Brothers 
only came on one occasion to address the issues with respect to 
the creek installed and the multiple cracks in the creek, and for 
the period of those calls being made and no response, it would be 
appropriate and certainly within the powers of this court to find 
that the statute of limitations built into the contract would be 
tolled during the period of time that Mr. Mardesich was unable to 
reach Anthony Pools. 
Now the issue of damages is fairly clear to the Court as 
a result of the Court's findings and the breach of the Anthony 
Brothers contract by Anthony Brothers in numerous ways. I would 
point out that those ways are specifically enumerated in Exhibit 
16 and the testimony of Mr. Mardesich. Anthony Brothers's 
contract in its specifications sheet specifies the three 2-
horsepower pumps to be installed, and the Court is persuaded by 
the necessary burden of proof that only two 1-horsepower pumps 
no, one 2-horsepower pump and two l-horsepower pumps were 
installed, and apparently the 1-horsepower pump was more powerful 
than the pool installation would accommodate, and that had to be 
replaced by an even smaller pump, so there is another breach of 
the contract there. The other breaches of the contract are 
persuasively outlined in Exhibit No. 15. 
Based upon the breach, the judgment is for $179,000 
together with interest at the statutory rate of 10 percent from 
and after the date of filing of suit, Counsel. That's the best 
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high water mark I can find because the date of the contract is 
unclear, the precise dates of the appearance of the damage is 
unclear, but we can certainly grant judgment with interest 
thereon from the date of filing this action, 
Now with respect to Sunhill Homes, the Court finds that 
the contract, Exhibit No, 1, entered into by the parties with all 
12 addenda is in fact the agreement between the parties, that is 
basically uncontroverted, and the exhibit that is in the Court's 
hands does and is found by the Court to be a full and true and 
correct copy of that agreement, 
Exhibit No, 29 offered by Sunhill Homes as the buyer's 
limited warranty statement appended to Exhibit No. 1 and 
referenced in Exhibit No. 1, the Court is not persuaded by the 
requisite burden of proof that Defendant's Exhibit No. 9 29 is 
a part of this contract. It is unfortunate that matters of this 
import did not have better record keeping, It may well be that 
such a limited warranty statement was prepared and used at the 
closing of this transaction, but without the actual document, the 
burden of proof would lie with Sunhill to try to find this 
apportion of the binding agreement, and I'm simply not persuaded 
that it is. 
I do note that Exhibit No. 29 bears with it an actual 
signature line for the buyers on the 14 th page of the document, 
and if we had that it would be no question about what we have 
here as we clearly have the real estate purchase contract for 
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construction, Exhibit No. 1. 
The factual circumstance that makes this case so 
difficult and required it to come to trial is that at the time 
that lot 8 was subdivided and improved and extra excavated for 
this project, the Court finds that it was exactly and precisely 
done as the grading plan, Exhibit No. 7, outlines. 
I am persuaded by the testimony of both Mr. Mardesich 
and Mr. Rogers and all the parties' positions in this matter that 
the home was built to that grading spec. The Court does find by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the 2005 flood changed what 
was contemplated by the parties when they entered into Exhibit 
No. 1, and that the defendant Sunhill Homes was required to adapt 
to those changes. They adapted to those changes and had every 
right to do so under the terms of this contract, as was argued by 
Mr. Dunn. 
In the circumstance where they very reasonably used 
the services offered to them after the flood by the National 
Resources people from the Department of Agriculture to build the 
riprap, and it's fairly clear by inference that in the process 
that's where the remaining portions of the let's call it 
buildable area of the lot were added on. The Court was most 
impressed by Mr. Rogers's calculation and testimony and 
description that every linear foot of the back lot line created 
27 yards of material that had to be moved, 
Mr. Mardesich's photographs in Exhibit 5 -- I'm sorry, 
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Exhibit 6, all three of those photographs show not only the 
placement of the riprap, but the substantial bank built up in 
that process, adding to the back of the home. The Court finds 
specifically that this was done while the lot was under the sole 
control of Sunhill Homes. 
Now the Court also finds that Sunhill was completely 
aware through all of its agents, that its realtor, Ms. Campbell, 
and also through our chief executive officer --
MR. DUNN: Roger Stratford. 
THE COURT: Mr. Stratford -- thank you, Counsel -- Roger 
Stratford that it was in fact Mr. and Mrs. Mardesich's intention 
to build a pool on this lot. The Court is also persuaded by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the additional soil on the end 
of the lot changed the plans on the part of the Mardesiches. In 
order to put their pool in they had contemplated an infinity 
style pool that did not have a hard edge all the way around it. 
When they found that they had more real estate within which to 
work, the reasonable position to take was to go with a different 
style of pool. 
I honestly don't know if there's a difference in 
expense, No one testified to me about that, but understanding 
the way that an infinity edge works on a pool, having one that 
would be quieter would be advantageous to some people. I like 
quiet, but I'm not going to impose my judgment on the parties. 
It's just that it changed. 
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When it did change, there is no evidence that any action 
was taken on the part of Sunhill to investigate the change in 
this lot from the condition it was in at the time it was sold 
when Exhibit No. 1 was entered into and the REP-C was entered 
into. 
It's the Court's position that the reasonable 
interpretation of the contract, the REP-C, Exhibit 1, would 
impose a duty upon Sunhill Homes to make investigation as to the 
utility of this additional buildable area on the lot because this 
was a different lot than they had bound themselves under the 
contract and placed the burden, the risk of loss that might arise 
on that when the lot changed. This particular risk of loss that 
came from the addition of what may have been as many as 15 feet 
of additional depth and soil because Mr. Hanks's study of 
uncompacted soil as much as 15 feet deep does impress the Court 
at least that there is potential of that much additional soil 
having been moved in the remediation project from the 2005 flood, 
but there was no bargain between the parties with respect to what 
liability under Exhibit 1 would apply to that change. 
The soils reports were exchanged. The admonition from 
the sales staff and Mr. Stafford as well was that soils issues 
need to be looked at, but this additional soil issue was left 
open to the sad regret of everyone involved in the project. No 
one stopped to say what do we do about this? 
If Mr. Anthony had said, •Boy, let's look at it," he'd 
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have fouoo ···it immediately right then. If Mr. Mardesich would 
have said, "Well, this is different, maybe we ought to think 
about it," he'd have found out then. If Sunhill had thought, 
"This is different, we better find out about it," then all of 
this really could have been sidestepped or at least addressed by 
the parties. 
Where there is no specific understanding of what the 
contract is mean and what the bargain is meant between the 
parties when this thousand year flood or between 500 and 1,000, 
maybe it's a 750 year flood if there is such a thing, when this 
occurred no one took the next step to say what are the different 
circumstances. 
It may seem somewhat arbitrary for the Court to place 
that risk in the hands of Sunhill, but they were the ones in 
charge of the lot during this period of time. So I find for the 
plaintiffs and against Sunhill in a sense that this is joint and 
several liability. I go with your theory of judgment in the same 
amount, $179,000 plus interest from the date contract -- at the 
contract rate, 10 percent from the date of filing of the suit. 
Now because of the Court's findings, plaintiffs are 
also entitled to their attorney's fees, and for the parties to 
understand the way the Court deal with the attorney's fees issue 
is that Mr. Spendlove in behalf of plaintiff will prepare a 
detailed affidavit of attorney's fees, and submit that to the 
Court. 
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DUNN LAW FIRM 
Clifford V. Dunn, #933 
Adam C. Dunn, #10926 
I 10 West Tabernacle 
P.O. Box 2318 
St. George, UT 84 771 
Telephone: (435) 628-5405 
Fax: (435) 628-4145 
Counsel for Defendant Sun Hill Homes, LC 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY 
JOHN MARDESICH, an individual 
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant, 
v. 
ANTHONY BROS. CONSTRUCTION, a Utah 
corporation, dba ANTHONY Bros POOL & 
SPA; SUN HILL HOMES, L.C., and JOHN 
DOES I-X, 
Defendants/Counterclaimant 
ORDER VACATING 
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND 
JUDGMENT; 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND 
JUDGMENT 
Case No.: 080502342 
Judge: G. Michael Westfall 
,--
ANTHONY BROS. CONSTRUCTION, a Utah I 
corporation, dba ANTHONY BROS. POOL & 
I 
SPA, i 
Third-party Plaintiff 
vs. 
MARIE MARDESICH, an individual, 
I 
i 
! 
I 
! 
: 
On March 17, 2014, Judge James L. Shumate signed the Finding, Conclusions and 
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Judgment for this case which was tried before him on December 2 and December 3, 2013. On 
March 28, 2014, Defendant Sun Hill Homes, L.C. filed a Motion to Vacate the Judgment, a 
Motion For a New Trial, and a Motion To Stay Execution of the Judgment. The Court having 
heard argument and being fully advised in the premises, does hereby Vacate the Judgment 
against Defendant Sun Hill Homes, L.C., previously entered in the above entitled Court on 
March 17, 2014, and does further issue the following Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
1. Sun Hill was the developer and promoter of certain properties within the 
Sunbrook Communities, located in Washington County, Utah. 
2. On or about July 31, 2003, Rosenberg Associates provided a Geotechnical 
Investigation for Sun Hill Homes for the property that would come to be known as the 
Pointe at Sunbrook which is also known as the Woodlands at Sunbrook, the subdivision 
where the Plaintiffs Lot 8 is located. 
3. In addition to the Geotechnical Investigation, Rosenberg Associates prepared a 
Grading Plan for the Pointe at Sunbrook which is also known as the Woodlands at 
Sunbrook, the subdivision where the Plaintiffs Lot 8 is located. 
4. Prior to entering into the REPC, Sun Hill, retained Applied Geotechnical 
Engineering Consultants, Inc., (hereinafter "AGEC") to perform various tests and 
evaluations on Lots 1-3 and 5-17 in the Woodlands Subdivision, which resulted in a 
September 21, 2004 AGEC Geotechnical Investigation. 
5. On or about December 4, 2004, Plaintiff entered into a Real Estate Purchase 
Contract for Construction (hereinafter "REPC") with Sun Hill with regard to the property which 
is the subject of this litigation (hereinafter "Property" or "Lot 8"). 
6. The REPC, dated November 16, 2004, was signed by Marie Mardesich, who was 
defined in the REPC as "Buyer''. 
7. . John and Marie Mardesich signed twelve (12) addenda to the REPC from 
September 12, 2005 to May 15, 2006. 
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8. The REPC dated November 16, 2004, together with the twelve (12) signed 
addenda to the REPC, which addenda were executed from September 12, 2005 to May 15, 2006, 
constitute the entire agreement between Plaintiff Mardesich and Defendant Sun Hill Homes, 
L.C., and constitute a fully-integrated written contract. 
9. On or about May 16, 2006, Plaintiff and Sun Hil I "closed" on the sale of the 
Property and Sun Hill conveyed the Property to Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant by Special 
Warranty Deed (hereinafter "Warranty Deed") which was recorded on or about June 6, 2006. 
10. After the property had been deeded to Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant by Sun 
Hill, Plaintiff hired Anthony Bros. to construct a pool in the backyard of Lot 8 at the Woodlands. 
11. After June 6, 2006, Plaintiff contracted with Defendant Anthony Bros. 
Construction to constmct a pool at the Property conveyed to it by Sun Hill (hereinafter "Pool"). 
12. Plaintiff never had a contract with Sun Hill for Sun Hill to construct the Pool. 
13. Sun Hill did not construct the Pool and the Pool was constructed at the Property 
after Plaintiff accepted title to the Property. 
14. Defendant Anthony Bros Construction applied for and received a building permit 
for the Pool from the City of St. George on or about September 1, 2006. 
15. Anthony Bros dug and excavated the hole for the Pool before commencing the 
construction or the installation of the Pool. 
16. 
17. 
The pool and spa experienced significant differential settlement after construction. 
Plaintiff John Mardesich had a copy of the soils report and offered it to Anthony 
Brothers Construction. 
18. Anthony Brothers Constmction did not accept the copy of the soils report and at 
that time was placed on notice of potential soils issues. 
19. During the construction of the pool, while the re bar was being placed in the pool 
pnor to the application of gunite, Jared Hanks of AGEC noticed the construction of the 
swimming pool and went to Anthony Brothers Construction and disclosed potential soils 
conditions. 
20. Plaintiff John Mardesich did not state to Anthony Brothers that the state of the lot 
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was pool ready. 
21. The action against Anthony Brothers was initiated within the one year time frame 
provided by the pool contract, and in addition, such time frame is contrary to public policy. 
22. The industry standard and construction of swimming pools and spas is a one inch 
differential in elevation from one side of the pool or spa to the other. 
23. The swimming pool at the Mardesich home is out of level by approximate 1.2 inches, 
and has the potential for additional movement. 
24. The spa is clearly out of the one inch standard and has a differential elevation of 1.9 
inches. 
25. John Mardesich did attempt to contact Anthony Brothers approximately sixty times 
without response relating to the swimming pool, creek and spa. As a result of Mr. Mardesich's 
attempts to contact Anthony Brothers with no response, the statute of limitations in the contract 
was tolled. 
26. Exhibit I presented at trial the Real Estate Purchase Contract for constmction is the 
agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant Sun Hill Homes. 
27. Exhibit 29 as presented at trial is not a part of the contract as it includes a signature 
line but contains no signature. 
28. At the time Lot 8 was subdivided, it was prepared and graded according to the 
grading plan prepared by Rosenberg Associates. 
29. Defendant Sun Hill Homes reasonably used the services provided by NRSC to make 
changes to the grading of Lot 8. 
30. As a result of the changes made by NRSC the buildable area of Lot 8 was 
substantially increased and every linear foot of soil added to Lot 8 required that approximately 
27 yards of soil be added to Lot 8. 
31. Exhibit 6, as presented at trial, demonstrates the placement of the riprap and 
additional soil on Lot 8. 
32. The placement of additional soil on Lot 8 occurred while Lot 8 was under the control 
of Sun Hill Homes. 
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33. Defendant Sun Hill Homes was aware, through its agents, Roseanne Campbell and 
Roger Stratford of Plaintiffs' intention to build a swimming pool in the backyard of Lot 8. 
34. While the original plans for the swimming pool had contemplated an infinity pool, 
the additional soil added to Lot 8 while under the control of Sun Hill Homes resulted in changed 
plans for the swimming pool. 
35. The decision to change the style of the swimming pool built was a result of the 
changed grading of Lot 8 and was reasonable. 
36. After the change in grading to Lot 8, Sun Hill Homes took no action to investigate 
the effect the changed grading had on the suitability of the Lot for the construction of a 
swimming pool. 
3 7. The REPC poses no duty on Sun Hill Homes to investigate the suitability of the soil 
added to Lot 8 for its intended use as a buildable lot for the construction of a swimming pool. 
38. There was never an agreement between Plaintiff Mardesich and Defendant Sun Hill 
that Sun Hill would be responsible to insure the suitability of the soil for constmction of a 
swimming poo 1 
39. Because the RECP posed no duty on Sun Hill Homes to investigate the suitability of 
the soil added to Lot 8 for its intended use as a buildable lot for the construction of a swimming 
pool, and because there was no agreement between the parties, that Sun Hill would be responbile 
to insure the suitability of the soil for a swimming pool, the risk associated with the placement of 
the additional soil is placed upon the Plaintiff Mardesich. 
40. Because there was no duty upon Sun Hill to investigate the suitability of the soil for a 
swimming pool, Sun Hill did not breach the contract by failing to conduct such investigation. 
Based upon the findings and conclusions above~ 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff John Mardesich and third-party defendant 
Marie Mardesich are hereby awarded judgment against Defendant Anthony Bros. Constmction, 
in the amount of $179,000.00 plus interest in the amount of $60,320.55 which is calculated at a 
rate of ten percent (10%) from date of filing the Amended Complaint which was July 22, 2010, 
through the date of judgment of December 3, 2013, plus attorney's fees as allowed by contract in 
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the amount of $64,953.03, for a total of $303,913.58. In addition, the judgment amount of 
$303,913.58 shall continue to accrue post-judgment interest at the rate of 2.13 percent. 
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that all causes of action of any nature of any 
kind by John Mardesich and Marie Mardesich as against Sun Hill Homes, L.C. be and are hereby 
dismissed as having no basis in fact or in law. 
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that the Supersedeas Bond posted by Sun Hill 
Homes, L.C. on August I, 2014 is hereby exonerated and the Clerk of the Court is hereby 
directed to return said funds to Defendant Sun Hill Homes, L.C. 
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that the issue of attorney's fees claimed by Sun 
Hill Homes, L.C. against Plaintiff John Mardesich may be addressed by further motion. 
------END OF ORDER------
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT 
JENSENBA YLES, LLP 
Isl James L. Spendlove 
Signed by Clifford V. Dunn with permission of James L. Spendlove 
JAMES L. SPENDLOVE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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1 John and Marie Mardesich who are here in the courtroom today? 
A, Many times, yes. 2 
3 
4 
Q. 
A. 
When was the first time you recall meeting with them? 
Well, we met -- I couldn't give you a date, but we met 
5 several times prior to their purchase, We looked at different 
6 possibilities, models, talked about options several different 
7 times before they made a decision to purchase. 
8 Q. Do you recall during those discussions if you had any 
9 specific conversations with them regarding what they desired for 
10 the home? 
11 MR. DUNN: Objection, your Honor. It appears as where 
12 we're going is to a discussion about the nature -- formation of 
13 the contract. Well, the contract has not been entered into 
14 evidence. We have no objection to it being so, but there's a 
15 specific integration clause that refers to -- that -- and it's 
16 paragraph 29 of the real estate purchase agreement which states 
17 that the REP-C itself is the -- constitutes the entire agreement 
18 between the buyer and the seller --
19 
20 
21 
THE COURT: So your objection that this is parole? 
MR. DUNN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Well -- and Ms. Campbell, we're using 
22 we're speaking lawyer here for a minute. What we're really 
23 saying is that this is outside the four corners of the contract 
24 and not admissible into evidence. Counsel, is there some 
25 ambiguity in the contract that would justify the Court looking at 
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1 the parole in any way, shape or form? 
2 MR. SPENDLOVE: Your Honor, as far as the integration in 
3 the contract, there isn't, although that's not where I'm going 
4 with this. 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. SPENDLOVE: It is not to that point. 
THE COURT: All right. Well, I'm going to sustain an 
objection on parole. Let's not go into parole evidence, but 
let's set the framework. Go ahead. 
Q. BY MR. SPENDLOVE: Back to the question. I'll speed 
this along for the purposes. Do you recall ever having 
discussions with the Mardesiches regarding the construction 
of a swimming pool? 
A. Yes, several times. 
Q, It was their desire to have a swimming pool; is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
MR. DUNN: Objection, your Honor. I don't know 
whether this complies with the contract. She stated that her 
20 conversations were prior to the execution of the agreement. All 
21 
22 
23 
24 
negotiations have been superceded by the contract, and therefore 
discussions about the swimming pool are still parole. 
TBE COURT: I will receive it not for its obviously 
··-·-·- -· -··-·-··"-·-·-····· ·- - - ··-·--·· --·- -- . ·--------·-·· ---- -····· ----··· -- - ·-- ---- -- -· ····- .. - --- - - ·-. ' . --- -- ---·· -- -
parole purpose, but just to explain the actions of the parties 
25 as they engaged in this process, the contract itself so far 
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controls. 
MR. DUNN: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I see where we're going. Go ahead, 
Mr. Spendlove. 
MR. SPENDLOVE: Thank you, your Honor. 
Q. BY MR. SPENDLOVE: That was some of the times you said 
you had discussions with the Mardesiches prior to entering into 
an agreement to purchase what was lot 8; is that correct? 
A. Yes. Uh-huh. 
Q. Did you have any discussions with them after entering 
into the agreement regarding the construction of the home and the 
lot on lot 8? 
A. Yes, and we discussed the pool several times after they 
made the agreement to purchase that particular lot. 
Q. Do you recall previously in this matter that you signed 
an affidavit? Do you recall doing that? 
Jl •• Oh, regarding this specific matter here? Yes, I did. 
Q. I have it up on the screen. It hasn't been made an 
exhibit to these proceedings because we have you here with us to 
talk about it. 
A. Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: Counsel, any problem admitting the affidavit 
at this juncture? 
MR. DUNN: Your Honor, if the witness is here, it seems 
to me that it would be appropriate for us to have cross 
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